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Abstract. Decentralization is frequently seen to provide an impact for the develop-
ment of local government. However, for developing countries, such as Indonesia, 
decentralization is not adequately understood from an administrative concept or 
merely from the government politics. Obstacle found in local areas, such as a low 
index of human development, low local competitiveness and inadequate public service 
can become an issue by local politics to interfere local government. Two cases of local 
government in Indonesia, Jembrana and Banyuwangi regency can be the illustration 
of this matter based on the case analysis and on empirical data analysis in those two 
areas. A descriptive analysis revealed that Jembrana regency is successful in running 
its local government, that can be seen from its high innovative level. Conversely, 
Banyuwangi regency, despite having a blueprint of its innovative area, encounters 
failure in its application. Failure or success in those two areas is more heavily 
affected by local political intervention in those intended areas. In Jembrana, local 
politics does  not too enormously interfere its local government, while in Banyuwangi 
the local politics strongly interferes. 
Keywords: decentralization, local politics, local government. 
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Introduction 
Decentralization is seen to give an impact on governmental development. Howe-
ver, for developing countries, political cost which is spent is far greater and gives a 
systematic effect for developing government. By using a systemic analysis, this 
following article illustrates a different description of decentralization, also provides 
two case analysis. A conceptual popularity as well as the intense analysis of 
decentralization is generally related to the development and the growth of developing 
[5; 12]. Indonesia, one of the developing countries, is also included in that 
phenomenon [6]. Reformation era signed by several political policies not far different 
from the previous one (Old Era 1945-1965 and New Order, 1966-1998), is 
characterized by a shift of central authority paradigm to local by moving from a 
centralized governmental system to decentralized one, which then raised local 
autonomous enthusiasm. According to Hoessein (2002), this shift is a big bang 
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approach [9; 10]. This is understandable, because a change required by Law is clas-
sified into a radical change or drastic change which is not a gradual change. That shift 
can be seen from Table. 
A shift of authority to local one brings two consequences, firstly, it has a more 
opened public political participatory area and democratization opens up a political 
space for citizens to be actively involved in any governmental matters in his or her 
community. Antlov and Sumarto (2004) noted that ‘local autonomy and democra-
tization have opened a political space for citizens to be actively involved in any 
governmental affairs in his/her own community’ [2]. 
Formally, decentralization provides a sufficiently ideal framework, allowing 
dynamic and democratic local political conditions in every local area. The 
enlightening process of improved public political participation is highly possible 
in decentralization era. Huther and Shah (in report result of Semeru Research 
Institution cooperated with AusAID and Ford Foundation (2004) ‘The Mana-
gement of Government and Poverty Solution: Early proof of Decentralization in 
Indonesia’) revealed that ‘a country carrying out decentralization has a better 
governmental management than a country having a centralized system. Citizen 
participation and public sector accountability is closely related to the decentra-
lization of policy making in the public sector’. This means that transfer of central 
political power to local politics gives a bigger space for local community to 
participate in dynamics of political life in his/her own local area. Besides, there is 
also improved and enhanced political participation in the society. Secondly, a shift 
of paradigm to decentralization brings a very vital change in its contribution for 
the sake of an improved political democracy. Theoretically, a shift from 
representative democracy to participative democracy appears. This second 
consequence is a logical fact, resulting from the wide extent of public political 
participation. This is related to two conditions needed to make participative 
democracy come true, which are: 
• a changing public awareness, who previously saw themselves as passive 
recipi-ents for everything given by authority change into agents of active 
social changes in the form of positive participation in the process of 
country’s decision making; 
• massive reduction toward any existing imbalances. 
This is the fact that local government is a conducive training place for democracy 
with an assumption that in a local area, local government is closer to its society. This 
closeness between government and its society is viewed as a package and a part in the 
effort of reformation, leading to democracy.  
The widening condition of the participative space causes a wider space as well, 
especially as participative political channels. Regarding this matter, a central power 
transfer to decentralized one allows local political channels self improve. This means 
that a local political channel which includes: (1) local government; (2) local 
legislatives (DPRD); (3) political parties; (4) concerned parties; (5) mass media - are 
expected to be the things that can be relied on regarding public political participation. 
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Table. Decentralization and Centralization 1900-2000 
Period Laws Politics Administrative Fiskal Indicator 
Dutch 
coloni-
zation 
Law of 1903 
 
 
 
 
Law of 1922 
Delegation of 
authority to 
local 
government  
 
Delegation of 
authority to 
provincial 
government  
Delegation of 
responsibilities 
to local 
government  
 
Delegation of 
responsibilities to 
local population  
of Java 
Delegation of 
authority to tax  
Decentra-
lization 
Japanese 
coloni-
zation 
 Centralization 
of formal 
authority 
Responsibility  
shift to central 
government  
Centralization 
of fiscal Centrali-
zation 
Revolu-
tion 
(1942- 
1945) 
1945 
Constitution  
UU 22/1948 
Policy  
 
 
Dutch  
1948-1949 
Republic  
of Unity  
Delegation of 
democratic 
principles  
 
Federal state 
Delegation of 
responsibilities 
 
 
 
 
Decentralization 
of  administration 
Fiscal 
devolution/ 
tranference 
 
 
 
Decentraliza- 
tion of fiscal  
Centrali-
zation 
Old 
Order 
(1945- 
1965) 
Unity 
 
UU 1957 
 
Presidential 
Decree of 1959 
Unitary State 
 
Power/authority 
distribution of 
democracy  
Administrative 
centralization 
Administrative 
transfer, cen-
tralization of  
administration 
Fiscal 
centralization 
 
Fiscal 
centralization 
Centrali-
zation 
New era/ 
Order 
(1965- 
1998) 
Laws No.  
18/1965 
 
Laws 
No. 5/1974 
Transfer of 
Authority 
 
Centralization  
of Authority, 
an authority 
under civilian 
and military 
bureaucracy  
Administrative 
centralization 
 
Administrative 
concentration 
Fiscal 
Centralization 
 
Fiscal 
Centralization Centrali-
zation 
Refor-
mation 
Order 
(1999- 
now) 
Laws No. 
22/1999 
(This Law is 
then revised 
into UU 
(Law)32/2004 
Transfer of aut-
hority of demo-
cracy, strengthe-
ning of provin-
cial and district 
legislatures 
(DPRD) 
Redistribution 
of responsibi-
lity and autho-
rity 
Transfer of 
expenditure, 
centralization 
of revenue Decentra-lization 
Source: Mudrajad Kuncoro. Developmental Economics, (UPP) AMP YKPN, Yogyakarta, 
based on Jaya and Dick, 2001. 
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However, a power transfer to local, in fact, gives a different circumstance. For 
developing countries, such as Indonesia, despite obstacles encountered, some prob-
lems are also faced. There are 3 problems which include: (1) the low index of human 
resource development; (2) low level of global competition; and (3) low quality of 
public service carried out by staff that becomes an issue for politicians to interfere 
more on local government. 
Firstly, Index of Human Development (HDI, IPM in Indonesian language) is a 
composite index involving 3 fields of human development, which are considered 
fundamental, which comprises longevity, knowledge and decent living. The Data from 
United Nations (UN Index) concerning Human Development Index, provides an 
indicator how low the developing countries’ index have, which is in the level of 0.700 
below. This illustrated that the meaning of human development needs improving. The 
varied development index among provinces illustrates imbalanced development in 
several developmental sectors.  
The development in western part of Indonesia is more likely to be faster than 
in the eastern part of Indonesia. In other side, a middle term developmental draft 
plan 2004-2009 identifies that there were 199 (43%) under developed regencies, 
with a concentration in the eastern part of Indonesia 62% and western part of 
Indonesia 38%. In 2007 there were 28 under developed areas which had been 
improved, in 2008 there were 12 under developed areas which had been in better 
conditions. However, up to 2009, there were 34 newly under developed areas due 
to the expansion result. 
Secondly, in a global competition, developing countries are less fortunate than 
developed ones. In 2009, IMD World Competitiveness in the IMD World 
Competitiveness Years Book issued a ranking list of 57 countries in the world. 
From the issued result, the first rank to 20th was occupied by developed countries. 
In its statement, IMD stated that: ‘of the 57 economies ranked by IMD, the US still 
ranks No. 1 in 2009. Hong Kong has switched places with Singapore to gain the 
2nd place and is swiftly ‘closing the gap‘ with the US. Switzerland maintains its 
4th rank from last year. All of economies have increased or maintained their 
rankings compared to the US: Denmark improves one rank to 5th position, Sweden 
moves up 3 places to 6th, and Finland, a huge bound from 15th place last year to 
9th place. Norway maintains its 11th position‘. 
The most spectacular was Indonesia, rising from 51 to 42. Conversely, Estonia 
dropped from 12 to 35. Meanwhile, some countries got a substantial change such as 
Colombia (51), Greece (52) and Taiwan (23) which fell 10 levels from the previous 
position, followed by Rumania (from 45 to 54). Some significant changes included 
Luxembourg (from 5 to 12), Hungarian (from 38 to 45), Spain (from 33 to 39) and 
Ireland (from 12 to 19) (IMD World Competitiveness, 2009). As seen from the 
reported data, Indonesia is adequately succesful in a competitive power, the most 
spectacular movements are seen for Indonesia, rising from 51st place to 42nd). 
However, in a specific field, Indonesia competitive level is still low. Global 
Competitiveness Report 2009/2010, which also score a country’s level of competition 
from the quality of its educational aspect, depicted that no Indonesian higher 
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educational institutution is classified into 200 the world best universities according to    
the most prominent agency of The Times Higher Education-QS World University. 
According to Jaweng (2009), to make matter worse, ‘the quality of local economic 
governance as a core of competitive power is not yet entirely well performed‘. 
Nationally, some areas still occupy a low competitive capacity.  
A study of local investment competitive ranks in 169 regencies and 59 cities in 
Indonesia was performed by KPPOD, a commitee of observing the implementation 
of local autonomy, together with United Stated Agency of Improvement and 
development (USAID) as well as The Asia Foundation. The result was that the 
highest percentage of areas had a low competition. In another part, it states that: 
Indonesia’s has consistently ranked below other ASEAN countries on the 
Investment Climate and has often found itself at the bottom of the pack. According 
to the World Economic Forum (WEF), Indonesia ranked 69 out of 104 countries. 
This is slightly better than in 2003, when Indonesia was number 72, but it is still 
far below Malaysia and Thailand, at 31 and 34. Meanwhile, the results of surveys 
by the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) on global 
competitiveness show Indonesia’s ranking steadily declining from year to year. 
From 2001 to 2004, Indonesia’s ratings were 46, 47, 57 and 58. In 2005, Indonesia 
fell to number 59 out of 60 countries investigated, better only than Venezuela. 
Thirdly, in public service, index of corruption can be an indicator of improved 
public service. 2009 Transparency International indicated that many developing 
countries were still closely trapped in corruptive matters. This also was proved by 
main findings of The Asia Foundation in the Investment Competitiveness of 
Regencies/Cities in Indonesia in 2005 (perceptions of the business community 
ratings of 169 regencies and 59 cities in Indonesia). Kompas (2009) revealed that 
public service could be an indicator of corruption index. Based on Transparency 
International from year to year Indonesia Corruption Perceptions Index grew. In 
2000, it was 1.7; in 2001-2003 it was 1.9; in 2004 it was 2, in 2005 it was 2.2; it 
was 2.4 in 2006; in 2007 its Corruption Perceptions Index was 2.3 and in 2008 it 
grew to 2.6. A survey of Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) (2009) 
showed that the score average of national public sector integrity was 6.50 with a 
detailed integrity average in a central level 6.64, an average of public sector 
integrity value in provincial level was 6.18 and the average of integrity level in 
local government/regency was 6.46. If compared, a value of integrity of provincial 
government was lower/worse than that in central level or even regency/local 
government. The problems illustrated above provide a challenge for intellectual 
groups from diverse scientific perspectives to give an answer. For public 
administration, in the last 30 years, an answer has been done by conducting 
research regarding the substance of public organization behavior, public 
management and public policy implementation. When analyzed further, those 
analysis are related to improvement, leading to answers of the problems as 
illustrated above. Fredrickson and Smith in their book ‘Public Administration 
Theory Primer‘ (2004) attempted to make 4 coherent answers towards fundamental 
questions regarding the professional existence from several points of view, which 
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were: (1) can public administration theory be taken seriously? (2) can theory be 
important in a field as applied, practical, and interdisciplinary as public 
administration? (3) which are the most promising theoretical approaches? (4) how 
can theory be useful?   
Decentralization: an intelectual discussion  
Decentralization which is understood as a transfer of responsibilities and 
authorities toward public function from central government to local governments 
is a multidimensional and complex concept. Initially, according to Hoessein 
(2002), the concept of decentralization is autonomy of the community existing in a 
specific region, which is then interpreted as a responsible element, regulating and 
administering which are conceptually implemented by local government [9]. In an 
implementation aspect, there is a dimensional shift in which the shift from 
centralized to decentralized is seen to give a significant impact for devolution/ 
transference of authority to local area. Smith (1985) identified some decentrali-
zation benefits, which made up: ‘(a) political education; (b) training in political; 
(c) political stability; (d) political capacity; (f) accountability; (g) responsive-
ness‘. While Rondinelli (1981) stated that ‘decentralization is closely related to a 
principle of local government security, participation and accountability‘, Esman 
and Uphoff (1988) identified 7 benefits of decentralization: ‘(a) accurate and 
representative information; (b) adaptation of programs; (c) group communication; 
(d) resource mobilization; (e) local expertise; (f) better utilization and mainte-
nance of facilities and services; (g) cooperation‘. Besides, Antlov (2002) noted 
that ‘local autonomy‘ has opened a political space for citizens to be actively 
involved in the governmental implementation in his own community‘ [1], or 
Devas’s statement (1997), ‘making local services more responsive to consumers 
and of enhancing local democracy‘ [6; p. 353]. Ichimura’s and Bahl statement 
(2009): ‘One might test the hypothesis that the benefits of decentralization 
outweigh the costs, by looking for evidence on the growing fiscal importance of sub-
national governments‘ [12, p. 7]. 
In addition, the transfer of power and authority of local leader provides 
flexibility for local areas to dig up or optimize local capacity to maximize wider 
usefulnesss for the intended areas. That condition, indeed, can be separated from 
the global demand of local area independence with a conception of ‘a competitive 
benefit‘. This also means that a demand of decentralized governmental system is a 
local independence with a capacity and optimized capital which are derived from 
the intended areas.  Consequently, the demand of independence is the creation of a 
competitive area for the sake of sustainability of the area. In addition, the final 
objective of decentralization gain becomes the centre of attraction to be applied. 
Some discussions/analysis revealing the aim of decentralization such as World 
Bank expresses the purposes of decentralization which aims to enhance the 
provision of public service and public welfare via good governance. Prasojo (2004) 
stated that, ‘generally the main purpose of decentralization can be classified into two 
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important variables which are: the increase of efficiency and effectiveness of 
governmental implementation (which is a  structural efficiency model) and 
secondly, the enhancement of public participation in government and development 
(which is an approach of participatory model)‘.  
In power transfer, there are two changing impacts, firstly, the more opened 
public political participation. Formally, decentralization is an sufficiently ideal fra-
mework to create a dynamic and democratic local political condition in every area. 
The enlightening aspect of better public political participation is possible in decen-
tralization era. A country carrying out decentralization has a better governmental 
administration than a country having a centralized system [26]. It was pointed out 
that public participation and public sector accountability are closely related to 
decentralization of policy making in public sector. This means that political power 
transfer to local politics provides a wider space for local public to be actively 
involved in his or her dynamism of political life. In addition, there has been an 
enhanced political movement. In the analysis of political system, participation is an 
integral part in an input of a political system. In a systemic analysis, Easton (1965) 
viewed a political system as a conversion process or a change, which alters in-put to 
out-put. There are two inputs in a political system which is demand and support. The 
emergence of both types of input can only work well if publics understand and 
realize as long as their demand and support provide the understanding of political 
system running. Implicitly, decentralization gives a wider space for publics in 
realizing their political rights. This concept is related to the decentralization purpose 
as expressed by Byrne and Schnyder (2005): ‘decentralization aims at improving the 
active participation of the population in political decision-making processes. It 
implies that locally elected authorities must bear more responsibility towards those 
who elected them and that they must better represent local interests in political 
decision-making processes‘ [4, p. 5]. This means that a change into decentralization 
leads to enhanced active participation from public.  
Secondly, a paradigm shift to decentralization brings an important change in its 
contribution for the improvement of political democracy. This second consequence is 
a logical fact from the extent of public political participatory area.  
The significance of decentralization attracts developed countries’ attention. 
During 80’s, there were many local governments which shifted to a more 
decentralized governmental system [21; 25; 5], including Indonesia, signed by a 
revised UU (Law) of Indonesian Republic Number 5 in the year 1974 regarding 
Principles of Local Government in local areas which changed into UU RI no. 22 in 
the year 1999 regarding Local Government. Regarding law changes in local 
government, Hoessein (2002), stated: ‘a required change by UU No.22 in the year 
1999 and UU no, 25 in the year 1999 is classified into a radical change or drastic 
change not a gradual change‘ [9]. That is why, conflicts, crisis and shocks which 
accompany reformation are bigger than preexisting reformation. Compared to the 
reformation of local government in several developing countries, the reformation 
of local government in Indonesia is still tremendeous. This is a big bang approach, 
which was then  revised into UU of Indonesian Republic No. 32 in the year 2004 
Sjamsiar Sjamsuddin, Irwan Noor. Decentralization: a Question for Developing Countries 
 
 
16 
regarding Local Government, in which in 2008, several articles were revised so 
that UU (Laws) of Indonesian Republic no. 12 in the year 2008 regarding the  
second change of Laws no. 32 in the year 2004 regarding Local Government. A 
change of articles in Law No. 32/2004 was more concerned about local leader 
election. Articles revised were:  article 26; article 42; article 56; article 58; article 
59; article 60; article 62; article 63; article 64; article 75; article 107; article 108; 
article 115; article 233; article 235; article 236. For Indonesia, the historical root 
of decentralization development, in fact, can be traced since 1930’s. As a result, a 
system of decentralized government is inseparable for the development of a 
governmental system.  
However, it is unfortunate fact that as stated by Oyugi (2000), ‘existing decen-
tralization programmers often fall short of the great expectations that precede 
them, and fail to ‘deepen’ democracy‘ [17, p. 5]. This results from the difficulty of 
fulfilling a consistency aspect of a long term policy needed to accommodate a 
change in society in which that change is frequently triggered by the weakness of 
the existing supporting systems. In addition, political leadership is responsible for 
applying a strategic formulation (in a policy model and strategic priority) and 
executive leadership must be responsible for implementing strategies from the 
entire policies bear conflicts and responsibility avoidance. A study conducted by 
Riruako (2007) in Namibia concluded that: the progress made in the imple-
mentation of the decentralization policy in the Omaheke, Oshikoto and 
Otjozondjupa regi-ons in Namibia was painfully slow as a result of a number of 
constraints which include inadequate co-ordination, administrative inertia, a 
shortage of skilled human resources, inadequate central government guidance, and 
inadequate financial and other resources [19]. 
Several studies conducted such as in Bangladesh (Sarker, 2003) in Kerala (India) 
(John and Chathukulam, 2003) [13];  Columbia (Forero and Salazar, 1991; Holbrook and 
Finch, 1997) [7; 11]; Malawi (Tambulasi and Kayuni, 2007) [27]; Bangladesh (Mollah 
and Hossain, 2007) [16]; Amsterdam (Simmie, 2001) [24]. Fritzen’s analysis (2006) in 
Vietnam provided the same condition regarding decentralization [8]. A fundamental 
question which frequently appears in several research regarding decentralization is 
whether it gives an added value for local government or not (Bardhan, 2002) [3], 
(Schiefelbein and Schiefelbein 2000) [22], (Katorobo, 2005) [14], (Mensah, 2000) [15], 
(Reddy and Sabalo, 1997) [18]. Saito (2001) in his research in Uganda found several 
problems of the implementation of decentralization system, by stating: ‘newly created 
autonomy may be manipulated by local elites for seeking their narrow personal benefits at 
the cost of general population who are in dare need of improved livelihood. 
Decentralization may increase corruption at local level and thus this would not improve 
accountability‘ [20, p. 2]. The increased efficiency and effectiveness of public resources 
may not be realized, since resources (capital, human and even social) available at local 
level in low-income countries are very limited. These scarce resources are more 
effectively utilized when they are concentrated at the national level. Decentralization may 
also jeopardize equity among different localities. Resourceful areas may take advantage of 
opportunities created by decentralization while relatively poor areas cannot. 
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Decentralization: empirical gain  
To understand a decentralization empirical condition, there was a comparison in 
two regional areas carried out – case studies of Indonesia East Java province - 
Banyuwangi regency and Jembrana, the two areas giving an illustration of the 
meaning of the authority in  decentralized areas. Jembrana regency can be an example 
of an area successfully developed, while Banyuwangi regency can be descripted as a 
place overwhelmingly having a prolonged conflict.  
Jembrana is a regency of Bali, Indonesia. It has an area of 841.8 km2 and a 
population of 220,000. Its regency seat is Negara. The Regency of Banyuwangi is located 
at the easternmost end of the Indonesian island of Java and it is a very strategic area for 
those who want to go to Bali, since it also serves as an important ferry port between Java 
and Bali. Banyuwangi regency had a population of 1,488,791 at the Census held on 30 
June 2000, by 2005 it was estimated to have risen to 1,514,605. The city of Banyuwangi is 
the administrative capital. The Regency of Banyuwangi consists of 24 subdistricts. The 
success of Jembrana regency can be seen from the local progress of that area by referring 
to three indicators as illustrated in Laws of Indonesia Republic no. 32 in the year 2004 
regarding local governance, specifically article 2 paragraph 3 mentioning three objectives 
of implementing local government, which were: (1) the increase of public welfare, (2) the 
increase of public service, and (3) the increase of local competitive capacity. The 
illustration of success can be seen in the given figure below. 
 
Figure: The percentage growth of the Original Regional Income (Pendapatan Asli 
Daerah - PAD) of Jambrana regency’s local revenue, Index of Human Development 
(IPM), Public Service (Pelayanan publik), Competitive level (Daya saing), and 
Innovative programs (Program Inovasi) by year 
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The Success of Jembrana regency in implementing its programs (1999-2010) was 
not separated from a conductive political environment. Two supporting factors of this 
condition came from the political areas of the local leader and the support from the 
winning political party where the regency head/regent was elected. 
For a-two-period leadership of Jembrana regent, I Gede Winasa, there was no 
conflict both in his local society and Jembrana regency government. Both conditions 
were closely related to a regent’s success in his election of local leader supported by 
most political party existing in Jembrana. In his second period of local election, I Gede 
Winasa got his absolute winning. The support in the second period (2005-2010) 
achieved 88,56%. In addition, in a legislative aspect, I Gede Winasa, who was also a 
head of Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDIP) of Jembrana regency, had a 
significant asset. PDIP political party had the greatest majority in legislative. 
That condition was a prominent asset for the development and the smooth flow of 
the regent’s programs. As a result, it can be proposed that a political factor provides an 
important role in developing a decentralized government. This statement shows that 
programs in Jembrana regency could work smoothly during a two-decade leadership 
of regent due to the support of political parties which were a local leader supported by 
political party in his leadership and a winning political party which automatically 
supported any policy which a regent had. 
That condition was different from what happened in Banyuwangi regency. 
Although its government had a local government’s blueprint, the programs could 
not work effectively [23]. An incondusive political environment caused several 
conflicts for local leaders, both vertical and horizontal. Although the Mayor had 
39% of voters in local election in 2006, a couple of regent and his vice who were 
supported by 18 small parties, they still did not get any representative legislative 
in Banyuwangi regency. Conflicts in government body spread since the beginning 
of pilkada (The election of the local leader) results were firstly announced. In 
addition, according to the community aspect, several demonstrations happened, 
triggered by a forum of United Banyuwangi (FBB) and was supported by local 
legislatives. This in conducive political condition gave a role in the hindrance of 
several policies in Banyuwangi. 
In short, a political environment as an interpretation of legislative power and 
political party, in one side it can be triggered by decentralization success. 
However, in another side, it can be a hindrance for the success of decentralization 
which is being planned. That is why the understanding of political environment 
can be a factor that needs consideration in developing a local government 
decentralization. A political environment power which is based on UU no 12 in the 
year 2008 in Indonesia regarding the second change toward Law no. 32 in the year 
2004 regarding Local Government, allows local leaders to require/demand 
attention toward political environment, specifically a demand toward a local 
democratic environment.  
This condition needs a further understanding toward the meaning of local 
democracy. A democracy which integrates a real involvement resulting from 
political awareness, a political awareness which appears not because of the 
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interference of political elites or pressures from a winning political party, but as a 
consequence of the clarity and aware understanding of political party. This 
condition can only be realized if legislatives as the political party extension have 
awareness toward the creation of good governance. As a result, a local democratic 
process will only be created if local   politics will understand the political power in 
regulating the needs and its political role. This condition is a process in the 
paradigm of decentralization. 
As a result, the paradigm of decentralization is in fact a process of stages of creating a 
democratic government. The strengthening of decentralization stages provides a 
significant impact on the creation of governmental objectives implementation according to 
the good governance approach. Public policy implementation conditions have to be 
suitable and create open and responsible governance. Together, a political participation is 
a gate for a local democracy in the intended area.  
The extent of political environment scope provides individual flexibility in 
expressing political rights. Reddy and Sabelo (1997) called it as ‘individual full parti-
cipation in making societal choices and decisions is a natural outcome of the 
endowment of individual dignity, because it contributes to individual self-develop-
ment‘ [18, p. 574]. However, in other side, the extent of political areas is not based on 
requirements of personal capacity development that can lead to the political system 
instability as was proposed by Reddy and Sabelo (1997): ‘in recent years, ‘parti-
cipation‘ has become something of a political catchphrase and many people with a 
serious interest in politics have become suspicious of it‘ [18]. 
A political environment (legislative institutions or political party) can create 
success or failure of innovation being planned. A political environment gives a crucial 
value even as a supporter in local areas in developing decentralization in local 
government. Consequently, a political environment factor is a factor which needs 
more attention. Decentralization is seen to give an impact on governmental 
development. However, for developing countries, political cost which is spent is far 
greater and gives a systematic effect for developing government.  
Conclusions  
1. An authority shift from central to local, in one side, gives a positive value for the 
intended local area development. On the other side, this also gives a different value as 
well, specifically for local government in developing countries. Low Human Development 
Index, low level of competiveness as well as low quality of public service could be named 
as those reasons for the intervention of central government to local one, especially in the 
context of political value intervention (such as political parties). 
2. Two cases of local government in Indonesia (Jembrana and Banyuwangi regency) 
can be the illustration of political intervention in local government. Jembrana regency‘s 
success in its local government is due to less powerful political intervention (especially 
political party) in its government. While in Banyuwangi regency, its local governmental 
development/growth is less successful (less innovative), which formed as a result from the 
processes of dominant political parties in interfering local government.  
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3. For developing countries such as Indonesia, decentralization provides both – 
challenges and opportunities. There is a need of better understanding of decentrali-
zation from the field of existing local politics, specifically regarding the demand of 
local politics toward the leadership of local heads/leaders. Failure to understand a 
local politics dynamics can give a substantial negative impact for the development of 
decentralization.   
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Sjamsiar Sjamsuddin, Irwan Noor 
Decentralizacija ir besivystančios šalys 
Anotacija 
Decentralizacija siejama su didesne vietos valdžios įtaka, operatyvesniais sprendimais. 
Tačiau besivystančiose šalyse, tokiose kaip Indonezija, decentralizacijos poveikis yra 
nepakankamai ištyrin÷tas ir vietos valdžios sprendimų decentralizuotas įgyvendinimas 
vertinamas prieštaringai. Žemas žmogaus socialin÷s raidos indeksas, silpnas vietos savivaldos 
konkurencingumas ir nepakankama viešųjų paslaugų kokyb÷ gali paskatinti politinę valdžią 
labiau kištis į vietiniu lygmeniu įgyvendinamą politiką. Straipsnyje pateikta centralizacijos ir 
decentralizacijos koncepcijų raidos analiz÷, teoriškai apibūdinami iššūkiai besivystančioms 
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šalims, taip pat pateikiama dviejų vietos savivaldos atvejų – Indonezijos  Bali salos Jembrana 
regiono ir  Javos salos Banyuwangi regiono – vystymosi analiz÷ palankios politin÷s ir 
administracin÷s aplinkos decentralizacijos procesams aspektu. Remiantis mokslin÷s literatūros, 
atvejų ir empirinių duomenų studija, atskleidžiama, kad Jembrana regione s÷kmingai pl÷tojami 
decentralizacijos procesai, o Banyuwangi regionas šiuo atžvilgiu susiduria su praktin÷mis 
problemomis. S÷km÷s ir nes÷km÷s atvejai yra labai paveikę Indonezijos vietin÷s valdžios 
politin÷s intervencijos lygį skirtinguose regionuose. Siekiant stiprinti konkurencingumą, 
skatinant tolesnę besivystančių šalių raidą, yra svarbu analizuoti kintančius politinius 
prioritetus ir regionų specifiką.  
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